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LIXCOLX'S LOST CAUSE
r.V EDWARD (). SISSON
CAX any discussion of -Al)i-aham Lincoln be timely today? The
very world in which he lived and died has passed away ; even
the vision which he had of his country has vanished, and the Amer-
ica of his ardent dreams—"the last, best hope of man"—can never
be. The tame and human 'capitalism" of Avhich he had a friendly
inkling has expanded into an ominous monster, quite as bitterly ex-
ecrated b\- its enemies as the "Slave Lower" of Lincoln's day. The
very type' of man he was, frontiersman, has passed away, there be-
ing no frontier. Yet Lincoln is still interesting: there is a great
I incoln play— written, it is true by a-foreign hand; books still come
from the press about him, some conventionally laudatory, some criti-
cal, hostile, even calumnious. L.esides Lincoln stands alone among
.American figures in his universal human interest, having been vastly
admired all around the world, by ])cople to whom for the most part
the issues of Lincoln's own time meant little or nothing. Is it possi-
ble that even with the stage so completely re-set and the very per-
sons of the drama so diverse, "the deeper elemental forces may be
the same, and the final significance still vital? This is the view
which inspires the following discussion and, we believe, is sup]^orted
by it.
Because the discussion takes this view and undertakes to set
forth qualities exhibited in the public career of Lincoln which sup-
port the view, it is proper to sav in advance that it does not intend
in any way to add to the Lincoln myth, nor even to justify him
against certain charges which may be brought against him. He has
been accused of opportunism ; the very things praised here are cited
by others to prove the charge. He was condemned in his own day
as lukewarm in the cause of negro freedom ; this is in a sense ad-
mitted here, even insisted upon. Far more serious is the charge still
2 THE OPEN COURT
made by some Southern writers, that Lincohi liad it in his power to
avert war and yet deh'l)erately i)reci])itated the War ; even to this
there is no rebuttal in this pai:)er, although there are in it certain clues
which might be followed up toward a possible defense. But the paper
confines itself to a definite question and offers a definite answer to
this question. Also it seeks to rest the case upon grounds the least
open to controversy, mostly accepted historical facts, including ex-
tensi\'e citation of IJncoln's own official utterances.
The specific issues of I^incoln's day, slavery and secession, have
passed into history and concern us no more : it would seem that
whatever enduring fame I.incoln enjoys must rest not upon these
issues, but on something else, deeper, more basically human perhaps,
more ultimate in its significance. These issues were both adjudicated
by the victory of the North and the triumph of the party which
Lincoln led, and in that victory Lincoln played a major role. But
his supreme contribution was something (|uite other than these
services of his as leader of the victorious party, and in the irony of
fate this contribution was in the event rejected and brought to
naught. What he did offer, in the briefest terms, was an ideal and
a spirit, together with definite and crjncrete ways and means to em-
body the spirit and the ideal : his own utterances make it clear that
he considered these things to be of supreme importance, not solely
to his own country in its immediate crisis, but to all mankind and
in all human affairs. All this is to say that Lincoln's enduring sig-
nificance is bound up with a cause that was lost rather than w^ith
the causes that were victorious. It is this lost cause of Lincoln's and
its significance that we here seek to exhibit.
In the great conflict between North and South there were two
salient and obvious issues ; the abolition of slavery, and the preserva-
tion of the L'nion. The grand visible drama revolved upon these,
and these were both decided by arbitrament of war. Lincoln was,
up to the moment of his assassination, the spokesman and the ex-
ecutive head of the political force which carried through the war
and its settlement ; even before his death slavery was, if not legally
abolished, visibly doomed ; and the Union, although still dismem-
bered, was manifestly to be preserved—and as time showed, enor-
mously strengthened. These then are the imposing aspects of the
drama as played on the scene with battles, political movements, proc-
lamations, and eventually constitutional transformations.
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W'e come next to an emphatic negative—that neither of these
great causes which were won was in any pecuhar sense Lincoln's :
in neither was he an originator or pioneer, but in l)oth he was a fol-
lower W'here others had blazed the trail. Inasmuch as Lincoln is
constantly hailed as p]mancipator and Preserver of the Union, this
will seem strange : he w as the emancipator in the sense of having"
signed and issued, on his own official authority, the Emancipation
Proclamation : and he was likewise su])reme magistrate and com-
mander-in-chief during the armed conflict and did in those capaci-
ties inexorably demand the submission of the revc^lting states and
their return to the Union. I'.ut in both these causes, to use Xa-
poleon's words, "his mind marched with millions of men," he was the
symbol and executor of these causes but not their prophet or pro-
tagonist. Lincoln's own true causes, in wdiich he played the role of
leader and prophet, were quite other than these operations of aboli-
tion and of federal soliditication ; causes far less capable of drama-
tization, subtle, human, moral : causes which were lost and in which
Lincoln was defeated, partly during his life and more tragically
after his death, which canceled the last hope of success for these
causes. W'e must then consider what I^incoln's position and function
reallv were with respect to the two great issues which were won :
for his own cause, which was lost, had to do with these huge historic
causes, which were won.
First, Lincoln and slavery. Lincoln's attitude concerning slavery
was ([uite clear and definite, but was complex, with the result that
it was often misunderstood by both friends and opponents in his
own dav and is still seldom clearly understood. Yet it was really the
attitude of the great mass of people in the North, and, strange as it
may sound, of many if not most in the South. It w^as this attitude,
shared bv the mass of the North, which made it possible for him to
be elected to the Presidency in I860.
First, he "hated slavery" ; it was utterly obnoxious to him and
clashed with his dearest principles, both moral and political. He
"thought it wrong" : and this when Christian churches, north as well
as south, were busy proving that it was divinely ordained and plain-
ly supported by the P)ible. In his first office of any consequence, as
member of the Illinois legislature at the age of 30, he recorded this
view : when the legislature passed resolutions denouncing abolition-
ists and condoning slavery, Lincoln with one lone supporter read
into the mintes a protest, joining in the condemnation of abolition-
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ists. but declaring tliat "slavery is founded on both injustice and
bad policy." In 1854, in one of his earliest speeches of significance,
he speaks of the "monstrous injustice of slavery." But in all this
he might almost have been quoting Jefferson or even Washington
speaking a generation earlier. The land was full, north and south,
of people who disliked and disapproved sla\er\-, with a smaller
number who hated it intensely.
In the second place, Lincoln's ])olitical view concerning slavery
and political program for dealing with it were clear cut and changed
little, until the War changed everything. First, he was inexorably
opposed to the extension of slavery : this view governed his politi-
cal affiliations on all vital occasions. But he was also opposed to any
aggressive interference with slavery in the states which legalized it
:
the constitutional provision concerning fugitive slaves which Phillips
denoimced as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell."
Lincoln regarded as a covenant with the slave-holding states which
he was bound to respect. So he wrote to his friend Speed, a slave-
holder, "I acknowledge your rights and my obligations under the
Constitution in regard to your slaves." This compelled him to op-
pose the Abolitionists and condemn their program : and the Aboli-
tionists in turn hated and denounced him.
The third point is of great importance, and not quite easy to de-
scribe ; it was his utter incapacity to extend his hatred of slavery to
a hating of the slave-holder, or even to denouncing him morally. It
was his realistic sense of the actual institution of slavery as some-
thing historical, with a long background in the old world, and with
deep economic and social roots in its strange last stand in the great
American Republic. It was his persistent view that slave-holders,
slaves, and opponents of slavery were all human and all caught in
the mesh of events, all striving to live their lives in the midst of dif-
ficulties and perplexities and all entitled to humane and kindly con-
sideration from their fellows in spite of differing opinions and con-
flicting programs and policies.
Lincoln never fell into the prevailing Xorthern fallacy of throw-
ing the whole responsibility for the institution of slavery upon the
South ; he saw that the guilt, if guilt there were, rested upon the
Nation as a whole. North as well as South. "It is no less true for
having been often said," he writes in the Second Annual Message,
"that the people of the South are not more responsible for the ori-
ginal introduction of this property than are the people of the North ;
LINCOLN'S LOST CAUSE 5
and when it is rcnu'nil)cre(l how unhesitatingly we all use cotton and
sugar and share in the jjrofits of dealing in them, it may not be quite
safe to say that the South has been more responsible than the Xorth
for its continuance."
These elements in IJncoln's attitude toward slavery were defin-
itely fixed at the time of his first important public utterance on the
.subject, in his speech in answer to Douglas at Peoria in 1854. After
denouncing slavery as wrong, and the ~\Hssom-i Compromise as there-
fore also wrong, he goes on
:
llefore proceeding, let me say that I 'think I have no prejudice
against the Southern people. They are just what we would
be in their situation. If slavery did not now exist among them,
they would not introduce it. If it did now exist among us, we
should not instantly give it up. . . .When Southern people tell
us they are no more responsible for the origin of slavery than
we are, I acknowledge the fact. . . .If all earthly power were
given me, I should not know what to do. as to the existing in-
stitution. j\Iy first impulse would be to free all the slaves, and
send them to Liberia .... But a moment's reflection would
convince me, that whatever of high hope (as I think there is)
there may be in this in the long run, its sudden execution is
impossible .... I think I would not hold one in slavery, at any
rate ; yet the point is not clear enough for me to denounce
people upon.
These are striking words, not 1)\' their violence but by their modera-
tion. It is true they were uttered befcjre the heat of the conflict,
nearly seven }ears before the actual outbreak of the war ; but the
fact is that the fury and madness of the later period, before and
during the armed conflict, never changed Lincoln's attitude. In 1858,
debating with Douglas, in 1860, as candidate for the presidency,
and thrcnigh all his career as war ruler, he never shifted from his
position : he was against slavery, would not compromise with its ex-
tension, yet insisted that the slave states should solve their own
domestic problem ; and he demurred to all self-righteous condemna-
tion and all spirit of revenge.
Thus on the issue of slavery and emancipation Lincoln was em-
phatically a moderate, and so was unsatisfactory to both extremes.
The abolitionists abhorred his patience with slavery and his support
of the constitutional provision for fugitive slave laws ; the slave party
feared and hated him for his outspoken condemnation of slavery and
his unyielding stand against its extension. As a moderate, on the
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other hand, he was elected to the presidency and led the nation to
])()th emancipation and the refounding of the Union.
So much for slavery and emancipation: next, what of Union:
This question is, in and of itself, far simpler than that of slavery.
The South claimed the right to secede ; the predominant party in
the Xorth denied the right ; Lincoln became, by one of the most
amazing processes in history, the leader of a -war to coerce the
southern states back into the I'nion. It is true that Lincoln was an
ardent belie\er in the I'nion and inflexibly resisted any sort of com-
]:)romise or (piestion on this point. It is also notorious that many in-
fluential \-oices in the Xorth were raised from time to time demanding
that the war should l)e averted, or when once begun, terminated,
hy the sim])le plan of letting the seceded states go their way and
acknowledging the Confederacy as an independent nation. Greeley,
for exam])le, wrote in November of 1860, when secession was get-
ting under way: "If the cotton States shall decide that they can do
better out of the I'nion than in it, we insist on letting them go in
])eace. . . .whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliber-
ately resolve to go otu, we shall resist all coercive measures designed
to keep her in. We hope never to live in a republic whereof one sec-
tion is pinned to the residue by bayonets."
To all this Lincoln refused to yield : in utterance and in action
he made it clear that I'nion was the paramount issue and that slav-
ery was secondary. Even when he issued the Emancipation Pro-
clamation he justified it not on the issue of slavery itself, but on the
military necessity of exhausting every means to win the war and pre-
serve the nation. In this sense Lincoln was the "Savior of the Repub-
lic" : nor should we belittle in any way his profound and unvarying
devotion to the L'nion. In the famous "Lost Speech," delivered in
1856, he is reported to have risen to an impassioned climax, crying
out, "we will say to the Southern disunionists, we won't go out of
the Union, and you shan't." If this is of questionable authenticity
we find his view gravely and unequivocally put in his first Annual
^lessage: "The Union must be preserved: and hence all indispens-
able means must be employed."
We may well pause here to consider the vast significance of this
inflexible attitude of Lincoln with respect to the federal union and
secession. Even an ardent admirer must feel the force of the ques-
tion W'hether the fearful tragedy of the War might not have been
averted by a more tolerant and conciliatory policy on the part of the
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federal government—in other ^\•ords, on Lincoln's part. Xor can
it be denied that the apj^arent rigor of Lincoln's mind on the question
of the l''nion is strikingly in contrast with his flexibility and concili-
ation in general. The story of events in Airginia—her reluctance to
join the secession mo\ement and afiparent deep desire to preserve
the Lnion
—
powerfidlv snggests the ])ossibility of that great state
l)ecoming the bearer of conciliation frf)m the Southern side to meet
conciliation from the North. r)Ut Lincoln had. to paraphrase slight-
Iv ( loldwin Smith's remark, "an olisession for the American L'nion,"
anrl at that point his dexil)ility vanished and adamantine fixity took
its ]ilace. This, T must confess, seems to me the gravest question con-
cerning Lincoln's jxu't in the vast traged)' of the slavery conflict, a
(|uestion still not a(le(|uatcly treated.
Ihit still the I'nion was not his cause in any peculiar or individ-
ual manner; the doctrine of the "indissoluble union." of the perpet-
uity of the constitutional bond, and of the nation as supreme and
indestructible, had long been familiar to the whole country. LTamil-
tnn and ^yfarshall had cemented the legal fabric of the Union a gen-
eration liefore the war: Webster had clarified and illuminated the
doctrine of indissolubility. .V southern ]-)resident. Andrew Jackson,
had gi\en sharp rebuke in his ofticial capacity, to a southern impulse
toward secession ; Lickson's toast which so startled many of his
fellow democrats, "( )ur Lnion: il nnist be jireserved !" (^ft'ers almost
the \erv words of Lincoln's statement. Thus with respect to the
Lnion, as with resjjcct tit emancipation, Lincoln was simply the
natural and ine\itable leader of the great mass of the northern peo-
ple but was in no wise an originator or prophet.
If then these causes that were won in the war and its aftermath
were not Lincoln's ver\" own, what was his cause, that which was
truL- his and was lost? This is a far harder (|uestion to answer.
The \ ictorious causes are concrete, picturescjue. dramatic ; they fill
the ])ages of American history for almost half a century and are so
]i]ain that the wayfaring man may read. .Vbove all they were tri-
umphant, and fame blows its trnm])ets for successful causes. The
lost cause which should have been Lincoln's contribution to his day
and generation is far less dramatic, far more subtle and was terribly
vanquished : what wonder that it tends to slip through the fingers of
historians?' ^'et it is utterly real and in no way mysterious or fanci-
ful. Also this lost cause links up with an immense bodv of what we
8 THE OPEN COURT
know about Lincoln : it is more intimately bound up with his char-
acter and personality than is his more imposing official functioning.
This lost cause of Lincoln's naturall\- manifested itself in con-
nection with the two great issues of the day: slavery was to be
abolished ; the L^nion was to be preserved and reconstructed ; it was
on the method and n^anner of these two gigantic tasks that Lincoln
bent his mind and strove to make his own peculiar contribution. He
wrought into concrete form a i)lan for emancipation and later a
plan for reconstruction ; he preached them in season and out, in
messages to Congress, in Proclamations, in public addresses, in
conferences with governors, congressmen, senators, cabinet officers,
generals, and peo])]e in general. Lie pushed their execution to the
limit of his constitutional powers and doubtless beyond it. In spite
of misunderstanding, opposition, calrmny, hatred, and partial defeat,
he was still holding fast to hope of their realization when the as-
sassin's bullet cut oiT his life and left events at the mercy of far
other forces. Li the event both plans were utterly defeated, and be-
ing defeated have left almost no mark in our minds and little upon
history.
This is Lincoln's lost cause, or, if you will, his lost causes: it
is one cause in that throughout a common spirit and attitude ruled
both the concrete jilans. Thus there was one spiritual lost cause and
two lost causes in the realm of practical politics. For the adjudica-
tion of the s])iritral cause we must look to the two concrete causes
in their actual process and fate.
First, Lincoln's program for cmaiicipafioii. To most people,
north and south, emancipation was a word, and a word over which
to fight. Rut few seem to have given attention to the Cjuestion of
how emancipation was to be accomplished, or what was to be done
with the tremendous problems which must follow upon its heels, if
accomplished. Lincoln had long thought about it in a practical way
;
in 1854 he frankly said: "If all earthly power were given me, I
should not know what to do as to the existing institution." I know
of no wiser utterance in the years preceding the war ; it would have
been well indeed if all political leaders had been so modest, or
rather, so intelligent. In truth nobody north or south did know
what to do with slavery ; it would almost seem that the more ex-
treme abolitionists, otherwise intelligent, really supposed that abol-
ishing slavery would somehow abolish the millions of black men,
women and children who were the slaves. Lincoln, on the contrary,
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w as deeply concerned as to the manner and method of emancipation ;
the problem occupied his mind greatly and appears over and over
again in his public utterances. It appears in many of his state papers,
letters and addresses ; it is set forth in full in his second Annual
^Message to Congress of December 1, 1862, to my mind the greatest
of all his state ]:a])ers. Whoever would grasp Lincoln's mind on
this great i)roblem must read and re-read this message.
Lincoln's ])lan is commonl\- known as "compensated emancipa-
tion," but compensation is only one of the essential features of the
proposal, and ])erhaps not the most important. Not less vital cer-
tainly is the provisiim for both initiative and control by the states
holding the slaves, and the limitation of federal action to giving the
invitation and contri])iiting financial aid ; cfjnsidering the issue on
which secession was most commonly justified this was politicall}-
most intelligent, luu-ther, the actual freeing of the slaves was to
be gradual, taking, if necessary, thirty-seven years, from 1863 to
1900. Xor does Lincoln forget the \ast problem of the Negroes once
freed : indeed it is ])retty clear that it was this as])ect of the situa-
tion which had for years ])erplexcd him ; he does advert to various
possibilities—segregation in territory assigned for the purpose and
transportation back to Africa, in particular. The main point is that
his mind is grappling resolutel}- with the whole jjicture of the thing
to be dealt with ; this is the essence of intelligence.
In all his many utterances not a word is said even suggesting
the general enfranchisement of the freed Negroes. How conservative
his view was on this phase of the problem may be inferred from a
letter in 1864 to the new L'nion governor of Louisiana: "I barely
suggest for your private consideration, whether some of the colored
people may be let in (to the franchise) as, for instance, the very in-
telligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our
ranks. .. .This is only a suggestion, not for the public, but to you
alone." This, too, seems far more intelligent than what was actual-
ly done, with such disastrous consequences to both races in the
South.
We may well revert now to Lincoln's own words, particularly
the great Second Annual Message. He introduces the subject thus
:
Among the friends of the L^nion there is great diversity of
sentiment and of policy in regard to slavery and the African
race amongst us. Some would perpetuate slavery ; some would
abolish it suddenly, and without compensation ; some would
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abolish it gradually, and with compensation ; some would re-
move the freed people from us, and some would retain them
with us : and there are yet other minor diversities. Because of
these diversities we waste much strength in struggles among
ourselves.
. . .These articles are intended to embody a plan of
such mutual concessions. If the plan shall be adopted, it is as-
sumed that emancipation will follow at least in several of the
states.
As to the first article, the main points are: first, the eman-
cipation ; secondly, the length of time for consummating it
—thirty-seven years ; and thirdly, the compensation.
The emancipation will be unsatisfactory to the advocates
of perpetual slavery ; but the length of time should greatly
mitigate their dissatisfaction. The time spares both races
from the evils of sudden derangement—in fact, from the ne-
cessity of any derangement. . .-.Another class will hail the
prospect of emancipation, but will deprecate the length of
time. They will feel that it gives too little to the now living
slaves. But it really gives them much. It saves them from
the vagrant destitution which must largely attend immediate
emancipation in localities where their numbers are very great
;
and it gives the inspiring assurance that their j^osterity shall
be free forever.
Xext Lincoln puiuts out the striking fact that such a plan would
tend to shorten the duration of the war, ])erhaps even availing to
lead the rexoUed states to make jjcace in order to seize the chance
of compounding the loss which the ultimate freeing of the slaves
would entail, lie then discusses \ariors as])ects of the proposal,
with relevant statistical data, and with consideration of manv pos-
si])le objections, lie concludes with an ap])eal to the hearts of his
audience, so unusual in a document of this nature that he ai)ologizes
for its tone
:
Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted
would shorten the war, and thus lessen its expenditure of
money and blood? Is is doubted that it would restore the
national authority and national prosperity, and perpetuate
both indefinitely? Is it doubted that we here—Congress and
executive—can secure its adoption? Will not the good people
respond to a united and earnest appeal from us? Can we,
can they, by any other means so certainly or so speedily as-
sure these vital objects? We can succeed only by concert. It
is not "Can any of us imagine better?" but "Can we all do bet-
ter?" Object whatsoever is possible, still the question occurs,
"Can we do better?"
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Lincoln was thus facing- the facts with rcgarrl to the freeing of
the slaves and the abolition of the institution of slavery: although
desiring that all men should be free, he saw intensely the huge proli-
leni of the millions of freed slaxes; althorgh the leader of the
Xorth, he could not forget the just claims ()f the South. So he labors
in this great message to get his Xorthern audience. Congress, and
the ]:ieo|)le. to see the facts as he does, ancl he l)eseeches them to
la_\- aside liatred and ])reiudice and act before it is too late. Tie rises
in his ])eroration in what may well be considered the highest pitch
of his elof|uence :
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy
l^resent. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we
must rise with the occasion. As our case is now. so we must
think anew and act anew. W'e must disenthrall ourselves, and
then we shall save our country ... .W'e shall nobly save or
meanly lose the last, best hope of earth. Other means may
succeed : this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, gener-
ous, just—a wa}- which, if followed, the world will forever
applaud, and ( lod must forever bless.
These wise and just proposals of Lincoln met at first with no
little ai:iproval, and the ]u-os]-)ect of their realization seemed bright.
Lincoln's s])ecial message in March of 1862 proposing a resolution
on the subject was received fa\orably by Congress, and the resolu-
tion passed by large majorities in both houses, better yet. Congress
in .\])ril of the same }"ear ])assed an act to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia, and this act included at least two of Lincoln's
favorite ])rinciples— compensation and colonization, ^'et in the final
event all came to naught : emancipation, wdien it came, was neces-
sarily a mere l)lanket flecree, without any etiective recognition of
the practical and concrete asj)ects of the situation. TTate. fear, mu-
tual animosity, and sus]iicion, not only between the two combatant
jieoples, but in the midst of both, brought to naught the carefully
nurtured plan and exposed the outcome to passion and chance.
It is true that Lincoln never completely gave up his hopes: even
as late as February of 1865. he laid before his Cabinet a plan tt^
offer the Confederate government four hundred million dollars as
purchase price for the slaves : but all except Seward were against
it, and Lincoln sadly folded and laid away the draft of the proposal.
Thus ended the first of Lincoln's "T.ost Causes" : the black men Avere
to be freed, but not in his "plain, peaceful, generous, just" way.
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The other concrete lost cause was Rcconstnictioii. Lincohi's
policy and actions in this field are the most characteristic and strik-
ing of all his official career: yet they threw him into collision with
the most pcnverful factions in the North and hronght down upon
his head the hitterest hatred and denunciation. These policies were
precisely consonant with his unvarying view that slavery was a
national and not a southern sin, and that the people of the seceded
states were not traitors nor criminals but erring brethren. So when
the armed conflict began to favor the Union side, and portions of the
revolted area began to be occupied by Union troops, Lincoln prompt-
ly took steps to authorize and encourage local Union elements to set
up loyal state governments and reestablish relations with the federal
authority. Again we find him proposing a clear-cut plan for action,
simple indeed, yet sufficient to open the way for the states concerned
to get back into the Union. This i)lan, too, might well be called
"plain, peaceful, generous, just." It was, as events ]:)roved, quite
too generous.
Three short documents afiford a clear and efifective picture of the
plan and of Lincoln's grounds for proposing it : the Proclamation
in which it is officially announced, December 8, 1863 ; the last three
or four pages of the Annual Message of the same date ; and—
a
solemn and touching fact—his last public address, on April 11. 1865,
two days after the surrender of Lee at Appomatox and three days
before his assassination. This address explains and defends his re-
construction policy against the bitter attacks which were being made
upon it. Of this address Stephenson well says, "It is the final state-
ment of a policy toward helpless opponents—he refused to call
them enemies—which among the conquerors of history is hardly,
if ever, to be paralleled."
The "Proclamation of xAmnesty and Reconstruction" was indeed
astoundingly liberal : it ofifered full amnesty to the people in the
revolted states upon their taking an oath of allegiance to the United
States—with certain limited exceptions, chiefly Confederate officers
above the rank of colonel and former officials of the United States
who had joined the rebellion. Most extreme of all is the provision
for establishing new state governments: this mav be done by loyal
persons "not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast. . . .at
the presidential election of . . . .1860."
This Proclamation was Lincoln's supreme act politically, far sur-




(jwn con\-ictions and prrposes. The Emancipation Proclamation was
issued reluctantly, with great hesitation, and only after great pub-
lic pressure in its favor. The Proclamation of Amnesty was made
on his own sole initiative, without the shadow of doubt or hesita-
tion. P)Ut emancipation succeeded, and amnesty failed, so emanci-
]~)ation is remembered, and the greater deed of amnesty is forgotten.
Two points mark the greatness of this action: hrst. as Stephen-
son well says, in it he "carried to its ultimate his assumption of war
l)Owers. Xo recjucst was made for Congressional cooperation. The
message which the Proclamation accompanied was informative
only.'"i Second, the terms of the Proclamation were a flat defiance
of the powerful radical faction in his own party. Moreover no pres-
sure from the outside, no immediate aspect of events, impelled to
this action, as had been the case with the Emancipation Proclama-
tion : this stroke came from Lincoln's own mind and character.
Xo wonder that Stephenson lists this episode under the title "Au-
dacities."
When the Proclamation was issued Lincoln had already been for
more than four months in correspondence with General P>anks. mili-
tary governor of Louisiana, concerning movements of loyal citi-
zens of that state for a reconstructed state government : Ranks was
instructed and urged to foster such movements, under proper con-
ditions. It was characteristic of Lincoln's mind that the logic of the
Proclamation is definitely based upon the actual experience in
Louisiana. Louisiana moved forward in the reorganization of ifs
government, with the full recognition and support of the executive
branch of the national government. The new state constitution
abolished slavery and empowered the legislature to confer the fran-
chise upon the freed men at its discretion, a remarkable manifesta-
tion of liberality, explained in part perhaps by the generosity of
Lincoln toward the new state.
Here too, by good fortune, we have Lincoln's own words in his
very last public utterance, an address made to a large crowd at the
\\'hite House on the evening of April 11th. after the surrender of
Lee on April 9th. He deals, with the utmost ])atience and good
humor, with the conflict concerning his policy of welcome to the
returning states, and particularly with the actual case of Louisiana
:
"Reconstruction," he says
is fraught Avith great difficulty. . . .There is no authorized or-
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gan for us to deal with. .. .We must simply begiu with and
mold from disorganized and discordant elements .... I am
much censured for some supposed agency in setting up and
seeking to sustain the new state government of Louisiana.
In this I have done just so much as, and no more than, the
public knows. . . .
Still the question is not whether the Louisiana govern-
ment, as it stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question
is, Will it be wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it,
or to reject and disperse it? Can Louisiana be brought into
proper practical relation with the L'nion sooner by sustaining
or by discarding her new state government? Some 12,000
voters in the heretofore slave state of T^ouisiana have sworn
allegiance to the L'nion, assumed to be the rightful political
power of the state, held election, organized a state govern-
ment, adopted a free-state constitution, giving the benefit of
public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the
legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored
man. Their legislature has already voted to ratify the consti-
tutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing
slavery throughout the Union. These 12,000 persons are thus
fully committed to the L^nion and to perpetual freedom in
the state—committed to the very things, and nearly all the
things, the nation wants—and they ask the nation's recogni-
tion and its assistance to make good their committal."
He admits the tentative and imperfect nature of the new govern-
ment, yet, he says with characteristic hrmcn- and sense, "Concede
that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be
as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching
the egg than by smashing it."
But to the radical faction in Congress Lincoln's action was the
signal for the bitterest opposition. The\' did what they could to
sn-ash the Lorisiana egg by rejecting the representatives of the new
Union state, they charged the President with usurping the preroga-
tives of Congress and violating his constitutional obligations. The
l)itterness of the vindictives. as Stephenson well calls them, against
this wise and magnanimous policy of Lincoln is one of the ugliest
episodes of our whole history. Its venomous cjuality is seen in the
spectacle of at least two of these vindictives actually exulting over
the nmrder of Lincoln.
Lincoln himself characteristically stood firm to the end: in that
last address already referred to, he was still looking forward re-
garding the prol)lem of reconstruction ; he closed with these words
:
In the present situation, it may be my duty to make some new
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announcement to the people of the South. I am considering,
and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will he
proper.
Three days later his voice was silenced and his task fell to nher
hands. What followed was in the key of tragic irony : Lincoln was
heloved in the North ; his assassination inevitahly aroused a storm
of passion and vengeance which played into the hands of Lincoln's
worst foes and wrecked the last hopes for the success of his plans.
I lis just and genernus jiroposals were swept into the discard, and in
their stead came that dark and shameful episode known as the Re-
construction of the South. 'Jdius were Lincoln's causes lost in his
own day.
The same sjiirit ga^e form to hoth of these concrete plans: we
mav call it the s])irit of intelligence and good-will: intelligence in
that it seeks to reckon with facts, and with all the ]K'rtinent facts,
in spite of hias and selfish interest ; good-will, hecause it seeks to
take all parties into accmmt and recognize all just claims. This was
the cause that was lost in hoth emancipation and reconstruction:
we have called it Lincoln's cause, hrt of course it was the cause of
the American peo])le. Northern and Southern, and of the free and
the slave : all suffered hitterly through its loss—Lincoln in a sense
least of all. for fate snatched him from the scene hefore the de-
nouement.
It is this greater. si)iritual cause that makes Lincoln still live in
the minds and hearts of men, far and wide—the universal human
cause of intelligence and good-will. It is a mere truism to say that
these are what we need today in every realm of life and aftairs and
throughout the world. It is douhtful if any man in great place ever
strove more earnestly to exercise intelligence and good-will than did
Lincoln. The intuition of mankind has so far sensed his eminence as
to treasure his memory and magnify his fame : may it he that he liv-
ing thus in the minds of men may yet share in the winning of the
great cause which was lost in his own dav?
